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ABSTRACT 
  As a contribution to the wider institutional analysis of China’s enterprise reform, this 
paper analyzed three interrelated problems in the literature. It argued that principal-agent 
theory was not suitable for analysis of China’s public enterprises, notably state-owned 
enterprises, as by definition, it requires a decision-making principal and clearly defined 
property rights. Actual problems of the theory’s application included the enigmatic identity 
of the principals and the inability of deducing refutable hypotheses. One primary reason for 
the divergent views on the identity of principals was the widespread misconceptions on the 
private property rights. This misconception further led to divergent views on the nature of 
another important actor in China’s economy, the township and village enterprises. It is 
hoped that clarification of these three concepts would facilitate further and better 
understanding of the transition economy in China. 
 
KEYWORDS: state-owned enterprise, township and village enterprise, principal-agent 
theory, private property rights, China 
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INTRODUCTION 
  China’s reform has achieved great success in the past 30 years. The Gross Domestic 
Product has been growing at roughly 10% every year. The economy has transformed from 
the former planned one to the current market economy. Although government intervention 
is still widespread, some industries in China have now been observing the most intensive 
competition in the world. 
  The miracle of China’s success, in contrast with the relatively mediocre performance in 
the Eastern Europe, has attracted scholarly attention. In the early time, scholars observed 
forms rather than the essence. For instance, the reform in China was gradual rather than 
“big-bang”; agriculture reform preceded industrial reform, etc. Later, scholars investigated 
in more detail the institutional arrangements and proposed theories to explain China’ 
success. For instance, the “local state corporatism” thesis1 or “local governments as 
industrial firms” thesis2 or “state entrepreneurialism” thesis3 where local governments 
constituted and coordinated the corporations, the “federalism” thesis4 or “semi-federalist 
government” thesis5 or “federalism, Chinese style” thesis6, as well as “privatization from 
below” thesis7 or “privatization, Chinese style” thesis8 or “insider privatization” thesis9.  
Some scholars focused on the reform of the state-owned enterprise (SOEs). They 
measured the changes in the performance of the state-owned enterprises after different 
reform measures such as the increase in managerial autonomy10, performance contracts11, 
modern enterprise system12, privatization13, etc. The results were mixed14. Many theories 
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or models were used to explain this. Examples were the multi-task theory15, competition16, 
policy burden17, and soft budget constraint18. However, the most popular approach was the 
principal-agent (PA) theory. Despite its popularity, this paper will demonstrate that PA 
theory is not suitable for analysis of China’s public enterprise, because of the enigmatic 
identity of the principals and the inability of deducing refutable hypotheses.  
A noticeable difference between China and other transition economies was the growth of 
the non-state sector, notably the township and village enterprises (TVEs), in the 1980s. It is 
generally agreed that growth of TVEs not only increased the volume of the economy but 
also increased competition which substantiated and induced further reforms. Scholars have 
been divergent on the nature of TVEs. Numerous theories or models were adopted or 
proposed to explain the success and the governance of TVEs. Examples included the 
“hybrid form” thesis19, i.e., a form that fall between market and hierarchy, the “vaguely 
defined cooperatives” thesis20, the “ambiguous property right” thesis21, the “insecure 
property right” thesis22, as well as the “double-sided moral hazard” model23. One primary 
reason for the divergent views on the identity of principals of the public economy and the 
nature of TVEs was the widespread misconceptions on the private property rights. The 
paper will show that the nature of TVEs is perfectly understandable if one has a correct 
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16
 Lin, Justin Yifu, Cai, Fang, Li, Zhou, “Competition, Policy Burdens and State-owned Enterprise Reform”, 
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 Nee, Victor, “Organizational Dynamics of Market Transition: Hybrid Forms, Property Rights, and Mixed 
Economy in China”, Administrative Science Quarterly 37 (1992): 1-27. 
20
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concept of private property rights. 
The main purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that misconceptions in private property 
rights could lead to misleading views on the understanding of the enterprise reform in 
China. Given that China’s transition experience is arguably the most important one in the 
human history, a correct understanding of China’s enterprise reform is vital to the 
understanding and development of institutional economics.  It should be noted that I do 
not intend to review all the theories in relation to the economic transition in China. Rather 
the emphasis was placed on the mistakes which could possibly bewilder the future readers. 
Hence, three interrelated areas were examined in detail. They are the merits of 
principal-agent theory in explaining China’s enterprise reform, the concept of private 
property rights and the nature of township and village enterprises (TVEs).  
The rest of the paper will be arranged as follows. The next section will survey papers on 
China’s enterprise reform using principal-agent theory. It is found that researchers had 
divergent views on who were the principals of public enterprises. The applicability of PA 
theory in China’s enterprise reform will then be questioned. The third section will show the 
widespread misconceptions of private property rights. This has led to divergent views on 
the nature of TVEs which will be discussed in the fourth section. The last section 
concludes. 
 
APPLICABILITY OF PA THEORY IN CHINA’S ENTERPRISE REFORM 
It has been popular to approach the issues of corporate governance in China’s SOEs and 
TVEs with principal-agent (PA) theory. PA theory has been widely used to analyze 
corporate governance in advanced capitalist economies. PA relationship happens when a 
principal entrusts an agent to perform a certain tasks. Here, there must be a subject, the 
principal, who shall be able to make decisions. Whether a state or a department could be 
the principal is doubtful, as both are merely concepts instead of decision-making persons. 
In addition, where the principal can entrust something to the agent, by definition the 
principal to some extent has property rights over that matter. However, it is well-known 
that the property rights were poorly defined at least in the early transition period of China’s 
reform. Hence, there are a priori reasons to believe that PA theory is not suitable for 
analyzing China’s enterprise reform, while there are indeed two major problems associated 
with the research works that make PA Theory not suitable for analyzing the issues of 
corporate governance of China’s public enterprises. One problem is the enigmatic identity 
of the principals. The other lies in the merit of the theory in deriving refutable hypotheses. 
Who are the principals? 
In the studies of corporate governance in China’s public enterprises, researchers differed 
in deciding who the principals were and who the agents were. Table 1 lists the PA 
relationships described by 17 works on China enterprises’ corporate governance. Generally, 
 - 6 of 23 - 
researchers believed that the government or the state was the principal24. Indeed, Li and 
Wu25 gave the generalized remark that “government agencies are principals” (p.2). This 
apparent contradiction is surprising, but it somehow reveals the difficulties in identifying 
the principals in the SOEs.  
[Table 1 here] 
Some researchers distinguished government from government officials. Perhaps they 
were aware of the fact that principals should be able to making decisions. For instance, 
Chen and Rozelle26 and Shirley and Xu27 thought that “government officials”, instead of 
“government” itself, were the principals. While Lin and Zhu28 did not distinguish 
“government” from “the people”, claiming that “government (or the people)” was the 
first-tier principal, while “government bureaucrats” lied in the middle-tier who were both 
the agent to the first-tier principal and principal to the lower-tier agents. Likewise, Tylecote 
and Cai29 and Zhou and Wang30 thought that the “state” or “people” was the first-tier 
principal, but they distinguished the “state” from the “government”, arguing that the 
“government” was the first order agent who in turn was the principal to lower order agents. 
Hence, two-tiered or multi-tiered PA relationships were introduced. 
Even more complicated PA relationships have been introduced as well. For instance, 
Zhang31 presented a “dual hierarchical PA chain” consisting of an upward PA relationship 
and a downward PA relationship. The former consisted of “residual claimants (co-owners) 
of the public economy” as principals and “central committee representing the whole 
community” as the agent; while the latter consisted of the central committee as the 
principal and “insider members of the firm” as the agent. Hence, the PA relationship of the 
public economy was “typically characterized by two ‘macro’ hierarchies”. The first 
hierarchy was formed via a delegation chain of power from the principals to the central 
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 Hsiao et al., “Shares versus Residual Claimant Contracts: The Case of Chinese TVEs” (1998).  Lin et al., 
“Competition, Policy Burdens and State-owned Enterprise Reform” (1998).  Mengistae, Taye, Xu, Lixin 
Colin, “Agency Theory and Executive Compensation: The Case of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises”, 
Journal of Labor Economics 22 (2004): 615-637.  Xu, Lixin Colin, “Determinants of the Repartitioning of 
Property Rights between the Government and State Enterprises”, Economic Development and Cultural 
Change 46 (1998): 537-560. 
25
 Li, David D., Wu, Changqi, “The Ownership School vs. the Management School of State Enterprise 
Reform: Evidence from China”, (William Davidson Working Paper No. 435, Hang Leung Center for 
Organization Research, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, 2002). 
26
 Chen, Hongyi, Rozelle, Scott, “Leaders, Managers, and the Organization of Township and Village 
Enterprises in China”, Journal of Development Economics 60 (1999): 529-557. 
27
 Shirley and Xu, “Empirical Effects of Performance Contracts: Evidence from China” (2000). 
28
 Lin, Yi-min, Zhu, Tian, “Ownership Reform and Corporate Governance: The Case of China's State-owned 
Enterprises”, (SJE International Conference on Corporate Governance and Restructuring in East Asia, 25 
Aug. 2000, Seoul). 
29
 Tylecote, Andrew, Cai, Jing, “China's SOE Reform and Technological Change: A Corporate Governance 
Perspective”, Asian Business & Management 3 (2004): 57-84. 
30
 Zhou, Mi, Wang, Xiaoming, “Agency Cost and the Crisis of China's SOEs”, China Economic Review 11 
(2000): 297-317. 
31
 Zhang, Weiying, “Decision Rights, Residual Claim and Performance: A Theory of How the Chinese State 
Enterprise Reform Works”, China Economic Review 8 (1997): 67-82. 
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committee. The second was formed via a delegation chain from the central committee to 
the insider members of the firms. Each player played two roles: he was the agent of the 
principal and the principal of the agent (p.234-235). The same author in one of his later 
paper32 introduced two other systems of PA relationship. The author claimed that before 
the reform, there were two principals, namely, “ordinary citizens” as the “original 
principal”, and the “central planners” as the “acting principals”; while “industrial bureau” 
served as both the agent to the acting principals and the principal to the lower tier agent 
which was the insider member of the firm. The author further described the situation after 
reform as one where there were two “legitimized principals”, namely, the government and 
the insider members of the firm, and one “double-faced agent”, namely, the industrial 
bureau. Unfortunately the introduction of such sophisticated systems of PA relationship did 
not help explain economic matters, as no refutable hypotheses could be deduced from these 
systems. 
Instead of referring to either the government or the people, Cauley and Sandler33 argued 
that although “an SOE represents a multilevel organization, for which principal-agent 
interactions exist between each pair of hierarchical levels”, the focal PA relationship should 
be between the manager as the principal and the workers as the agents. 
  Researchers sometimes changed their minds in different pieces of works. Examples were 
Zhang34, which has been introduced above, and Shirley and Xu35. Shirley and Xu36 
thought that “SOEs have no clear residual claimant” and “they are subject to many 
principals” (p.360). However, they thought that “government officials” are the principal in 
their later work37. 
  The wide divergence in identifying who are the principals in the corporate governance of 
China’s enterprises raises the question of whether the principals exist at all. Chang38 
apparently noticed the problem of using the PA theory to explain corruption, pointing out 
that such a framework “presumed that the principal itself is not corrupt” (p.6).  But why 
would the principal be corrupt?  Applying the concepts of property rights, as encapsulated 
                                                 
32
 Zhang, Weiying. “A Principal-agent Theory of the Public Economy and Its Applications to China”, 
Economics of Planning 31 (1998): 231-251. 
33
 Cauley, Jon, Sandler, Todd, “Agency Theory and the Chinese Enterprise under Reform”, China Economic 
Review 3 (1992): 39-56.  Cauley, Jon, Sandler, Todd, “Agency Cost and the Crisis of China's SOEs: A 
Comment and Further Observations”, China Economic Review 12 (2001): 293-297. 
34
 Zhang, “Decision Rights, Residual Claim and Performance: A Theory of How the Chinese State 
Enterprise Reform Works” (1997), “A Principal-agent Theory of the Public Economy and Its Applications to 
China” (1998). 
35
 Shirley, Mary, M. and Lixin Colin Xu, “Information, Incentives, and Commitment: An Empirical Analysis 
of Contracts Between Government and State Enterprises”, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 14 
(1998): 358-78.  Shirley and Xu, “Empirical Effects of Performance Contracts: Evidence from China” 
(2000). 
36
 Shirley and Xu, “Information, Incentives, and Commitment: An Empirical Analysis of Contracts Between 
Government and State Enterprises” (1998). 
37
 Shirley and Xu, “Empirical Effects of Performance Contracts: Evidence from China” (2000). 
38
 Chang, Tieh-chih, “Growth, Corruption and State Capacity? China in Comparative Perspective” (paper 
prepared for presentation to the Mini-APSA, Department of Political Science, Columbia University, 2004). 
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in Cheung’s paper, “A Theory of Price Control”39, the reason is either: (a) the principal is 
not the private property rights owner, or (b) the relevant property rights are not clearly 
defined. Indeed, Zhou40 argued that there was no principal in SOEs (p.139). Hua et al.41 
echoed this view and questioned that “who is really the ‘state’ and who represents it”. They 
argued that “the principal is invisible” (p.407), since if all of China’s citizens were 
considered as principals, it would be “too dispersed and powerless to exercise and control 
over SOEs” (p.408). 
  In contrast, the question who are the agents received less controversy. Most researchers 
believed that the managers of the SOEs are the agents42. Some others believed that 
employees of the enterprises are the agents43.  
  The wide divergence between the researchers’ opinions on the identity of the principals 
of public enterprises is the most persuasive evidence that principal-agent theory is not 
suitable for analyzing the issues of corporate governance in China’s public enterprises. 
Further evidence lies in the fact that no refutable hypotheses have been derived from the 
theory. This will be examined in the next section. 
The merit of PA theory in deriving refutable hypotheses  
  The merit of a theory lies in its capability of explaining or predicting human behaviours. 
In this regard, the principal-agent theory has been very poor in explaining China’s 
enterprise reform. Few refutable hypotheses have been decently deduced from the theory. 
This could be revealed from a review of 15 works that studied SOEs using the 
principal-agent theory. Most of them, or 11 works44, neither provided any refutable 
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 Cheung, Steven N.S., “A Theory of Price Control”, Journal of Law and Economics 17 (1974): 53-71. 
40
 Zhou, Qiren. Property Right and Institutional Transformation – The Chinese Experiences (Beijing: Social 
Science Works Press, 2002) [In Chinese]. 
41
 Hua, Jinyang, Miesing, Paul, Li, Mingfang, “An Empirical Taxonomy of SOE Governance in Transitional 
China”, Journal of Management Governance 10 (2006): 401-433. 
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 Hsiao et al., “Shares versus Residual Claimant Contracts: The Case of Chinese TVEs” (1998).  Lin et al., 
“Competition, Policy Burdens and State-owned Enterprise Reform” (1998).  Lin and Zhu, “Ownership 
Reform and Corporate Governance: The Case of China's State-owned Enterprises” (2000).  Mengistae and 
Xu, “Agency Theory and Executive Compensation: The Case of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises” (2004).   
Shirley and Xu, “Empirical Effects of Performance Contracts: Evidence from China” (2000).  Tylecote and 
Cai, “China's SOE Reform and Technological Change: A Corporate Governance Perspective” (2004).  Xu, 
“Determinants of the Repartitioning of Property Rights between the Government and State Enterprises” 
(1998). 
43
 Cauley and Sandler, “Agency Theory and the Chinese Enterprise under Reform” (1992), “Agency Cost 
and the Crisis of China's SOEs: A Comment and Further Observations” (2001).  Li and Wu, “The 
Ownership School vs. the Management School of State Enterprise Reform: Evidence from China” (2002). 
44
 Bai, et al., “A Multi-Task Theory of the State Enterprise Reform” (2001).  Cauley and Sandler, “Agency 
Theory and the Chinese Enterprise under Reform” (1992), “Agency Cost and the Crisis of China's SOEs: A 
Comment and Further Observations” (2001).  Chang, “Growth, Corruption and State Capacity? China in 
Comparative Perspective” (2004).  Huang, Yasheng, “Managing Chinese Bureaucrats: An Institutional 
Economics Perspective”, Political Studies 50 (2002): 61-79.  Lin et al., “Competition, Policy Burdens and 
State-owned Enterprise Reform” (1998).  Lin and Zhu, “Ownership Reform and Corporate Governance: 
The Case of China's State-owned Enterprises” (2000).  Tylecote and Cai, “China's SOE Reform and 
Technological Change: A Corporate Governance Perspective” (2004).  Zhang, “Decision Rights, Residual 
Claim and Performance: A Theory of How the Chinese State Enterprise Reform Works” (1997), “A 
Principal-agent Theory of the Public Economy and Its Applications to China” (1998), Zhou and Wang, 
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hypothesis nor tested one. This is certainly not to say that these works themselves are of 
little merits. It is the merit of the PA theory they used that is being challenged. Since these 
works did not clearly provide hypotheses, it is often difficult to prove whether there were 
any problems with the theory.  
Nonetheless, some problems in their assumptions or definitions were found. For instance, 
Cauley and Sandler45 assumed that  
  Principal’s wealth = agent’s total effort + exogenous risk 
Where “principal’s wealth may stand for profit or output”, if “prices are normalized to 
equal one, then there is no difference between profit or output” (p.42). There are two 
mistakes here. Certainly effort is not the only factor affecting wealth or profit. If doing a 
business is equivalent to making efforts only, then one could seldom go bankrupt if he 
makes sufficient efforts. Secondly, output times prices makes revenue, not profit.  
As a second example, Zhang46 defined “degree of publicness” as the number of the 
original principals and “the size of the public economy” as the number of public-owned 
enterprises (p.231). These are clearly problematic. If we follow this principal, in case one 
shareholder sells all his shares to another shareholder, then the “publicness” of this 
company is reduced. Moreover, the author has assumed in the second definition that each 
and every enterprise is homogeneous. 
By adding unrealistic assumptions or using arbitrary definitions, one may be able to 
deduce some propositions. However, this is of little value in explaining real world 
phenomena. For the present purpose of examining the merits of a theory, suffice it to say 
that a theory is of little use in terms of explaining human behaviour if it could not deduce 
refutable hypotheses. As to the PA theory, the question remained is whether the empirical 
works produced refutable hypotheses from the theory.  
There were 4 empirical studies47. However, none of them successfully proved the merit 
of PA theory in term of explaining human behaviours. The reasons could be that the results 
were mixed48 or had refuted the theory49, or the hypotheses were not decently derived 
from the perspective of PA theory50. Mixed-results should invalidate the theory as the 
                                                                                                                                                    
“Agency Cost and the Crisis of China's SOEs” (2000). 
45
 Cauley and Sandler, “Agency Theory and the Chinese Enterprise under Reform” (1992). 
46
 Zhang, “Decision Rights, Residual Claim and Performance: A Theory of How the Chinese State 
Enterprise Reform Works” (1997). 
47
 Li and Wu, “The Ownership School vs. the Management School of State Enterprise Reform: Evidence 
from China” (2002).  Mengistae and Xu, “Agency Theory and Executive Compensation: The Case of 
Chinese State-Owned Enterprises” (2004).  Shirley and Xu, “Empirical Effects of Performance Contracts: 
Evidence from China” (2000).  Xu, “Determinants of the Repartitioning of Property Rights between the 
Government and State Enterprises” (1998). 
48
 Li and Wu, “The Ownership School vs. the Management School of State Enterprise Reform: Evidence 
from China” (2002). 
49
 Shirley and Xu, “Empirical Effects of Performance Contracts: Evidence from China” (2000). 
50
 Mengistae and Xu, “Agency Theory and Executive Compensation: The Case of Chinese State-Owned 
Enterprises” (2004).  Xu, “Determinants of the Repartitioning of Property Rights between the Government 
and State Enterprises” (1998). 
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prediction of a theory must be certain to make the theory useful. These works will be 
examined in more detail as follows. 
Li and Wu51 examined the relative effectiveness of the ownership school of reform 
measures and the management school of reform measures. The only hypothesis that was 
derived from the perspective of the principal-agent theory was that “sharing profit with the 
manager will increase efficiency”.  The results were mixed, indicating that the PA theory 
may not be valid. 
  Shirley and Xu52 examined if and which of China's performance contracts improved 
productivity. There were two major problems that could easily invalidate the PA theory. 
One problem was that it was unclear how PA theory had led to the hypotheses. The other 
was that some of the findings actually refuted the PA theory. For instance, the authors 
asserted, without explanation, that bidding led to lower information asymmetry. Intuitively, 
bidding showed the commitment of the manager, which should mean that the shirking 
problem was less serious.  However, the results showed that bidding did not increase 
productivity, thus refuting such a hypothesis. Secondly, performance bonding clearly 
showed a manager’s commitment so that the shirking problem would be less serious.  
However, the results also showed that performance bonding did not increase productivity, 
thus refuting this hypothesis.  The authors showed unwillingness to accept the results and 
attributed this to the weak enforcement of performance bonding, but produced no proof. 
Mengistae and Xu53 claimed that the PA theory was supported by merely showing that 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay was correlated with enterprise performance.  The 
problem was that the existence of some correlation was not a refutable hypothesis, but a 
phenomenon.  We do not know for sure what conditions changed to lead to such a 
phenomenon. Likewise, Xu54 claimed that PA theory was supported by merely testing 
whether the advice suggested from the perspective of the PA theory was actually followed. 
There was no test for whether or not the principal-agent theory was applicable. 
The PA theory originated from Williamson school of thought in terms of “shirking” or 
“opportunistic behaviour”. The shirking problem is actually the metering problems of input 
productivity and rewards. People shirk because their productivities and / or rewards are 
difficult or costly to measure. The latter is one type of transaction cost. Theoretically the 
matter could be approached with either PA theory or transaction cost method. However, as 
it is difficult to measure shirking behaviour, it is hence difficult, if not impossible, to derive 
refutable hypotheses. Measurement of input productivities and rewards are difficult too. 
                                                 
51
 Li and Wu, “The Ownership School vs. the Management School of State Enterprise Reform: Evidence 
from China” (2002). 
52
 Shirley and Xu, “Empirical Effects of Performance Contracts: Evidence from China” (2000). 
53
 Mengistae and Xu, “Agency Theory and Executive Compensation: The Case of Chinese State-Owned 
Enterprises” (2004). 
54
 Xu, “Determinants of the Repartitioning of Property Rights between the Government and State 
Enterprises” (1998). 
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However, it is possible in some cases to measure them. The use of piece-rate contract is 
certainly one example where input productivities can be measured and priced.  Since I 
have not identified any work that successfully derive refutable hypotheses in my review, I 
hence doubt the merit of using PA theory to explain China’s enterprise reform. Of course 
this review of 15 studies which focused on China’s enterprise reform was by no means 
exhaustive. It nonetheless reflects the limited merit of PA theory in terms of deriving 
refutable hypotheses. However, whether this theory is applicable to corporate governance 
in advanced capitalist economies is out of the scope of this paper.  
One reason why there were disagreements on the identities of the principals is that many 
researchers did not have a correct concept of private property rights to which we turn. 
 
MISCONCEPTIONS OF PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Definition of private property rights 
It has been generally agreed that private property rights are a bundle of rights. Cheung55 
defined private property rights as three sets of exclusive rights that consists of (a) the 
exclusive right to use or decide how to use; (b) the exclusive right to receive income 
generated from the use of; and (c) the right to alienate the property. The right to alienate 
the property includes “both the right to enter into contracts with other individuals and to 
choose the form of such contracts”. These three sets of rights are referred to as “use right”, 
“income right” and “alienation right” respectively in the following text, although the 
former two are sometimes known as “control right” and “residual claim right” in the 
literature on firm or team production. For instance, Alchian and Demsetz56 argued that 
ownership of the classical firm is “the bundle of rights: 1) to be a residual claimant; 2) to 
observe input behaviour; 3) to be the central party common to all contracts with inputs; 4) 
to alter the membership of the team; and 5) to sell these rights” (p.783). If one generalizes 
No. 2) and 4) sets of rights to “control right” and No. 3) to alienation right, then this bundle 
of right was consistent with the definition of Cheung57. 
The importance of clear delineation of private property rights towards market 
transaction has been clearly demonstrated by Ronald Coase in his investigation of the 
Federal Communications Commission58. The idea that “delimitation of rights is an 
essential prelude to market transaction” (p.27) was later known as one version of the Coase 
Theorem, while the importance of market transaction in improving economic welfare has 
been established since Adam Smith. Given the importance of delineation of private 
property rights, which one out of the three sets of rights is the most important in 
                                                 
55
 Cheung, “A Theory of Price Control” (1974, p. 57). 
56
 Alchian, Armen A., Demsetz, Harold, “Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization”, The 
American Economic Review 62 (1972): 777-95. 
57
 Cheung, “A Theory of Price Control” (1974). 
58
 Coase, Ronald, “The Federal Communications Commission”, Journal of Law and Economics 2 (1959): 
1-40. 
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delineating property rights? Zhou59 (p. 233) argued that one of the merits of the Coase 
Theorem60 was that it pointed out that whether the property rights were clearly delineated 
could be revealed during the alienation process. This was because alienation of a property 
inevitably involved some subjective estimation of the value of the property, while 
“subjective” meant there must be a subject (owner). Hence, alienation right is the most 
important one among the three in the study of the property rights issues in SOEs. 
Surprisingly enough, many researchers have neglected the existence of alienation rights 
in their studies of China’s enterprise reform. Some authors have even omitted two sets of 
rights out of the three. Examples are Grossman and Hart61, Li et al.62 and Zhang63. Some 
have “only” omitted one set of rights. Examples of omitting alienation right are Che and 
Qian64, David D. Li65, Perotti et al.66, W. Li67, Zhou and Wang68. While the work of 
Furubotn and Pejovich69 was one example of omitting income right. In contrast to 
omission of rights, some thought nominal ownership per se was also decisive in 
determining private property rights70 Fortunately, at least there have been some correct 
definitions. Examples are Li et al.71, Naughton72, Putterman73, Smyth74 and Walder75. One 
implication of wrong definition of private property right lies in divergent views on the 
principals of the public economy which we have examined. The other implication lies in 
the analysis of the nature of Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs). These omission or 
misconceptions will be examined in more detail before we turn to the nature of TVEs.  
                                                 
59
 Zhou, Qiren. Income Is A Series of Events (Hong Kong: Arcadia Press, 2003) [In Chinese]. 
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62
 Li, Shaomin, Li, Shuhe, Zhang, Weiying, “The Road to Capitalism: Competition and Institutional Change 
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 Zhang, “Decision Rights, Residual Claim and Performance: A Theory of How the Chinese State 
Enterprise Reform Works” (1997). 
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(1997). 
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 Zhou and Wang, “Agency Cost and the Crisis of China's SOEs” (2000). 
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 Furubotn, Eirik G., Pejovich, Svetozar, “Property Rights and Economic Theory: A Survey of Recent 
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 Weitzman and Xu, “Chinese Township and Village Enterprises as Vaguely Defined Cooperatives” (1994). 
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 Li, Shaomin, Vertinsky, Ilan, Zhou, Dongsheng, “The Emergence of Private Ownership in China”, 
Journal of Business Research 57 (2004): 1145-1152. 
72
 Naughton, “Chinese Institutional Innovation and Privatization from Below” (1994). 
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China Quarterly 144 (1995): 1047-1064. 
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784-800. 
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Examples of wrong definition of private property rights 
Grossman and Hart76 defined ownership of the firm by “control right” (p.693-694) 
which is only the first set of private property rights. This definition was followed by some 
researchers, although normally they would have added the income right. For instance, 
Chang and Wang77 expressly claimed that they followed Grossman and Hart’s definition. 
However, they extended the definition of ownership by including both “residual control 
right” and “residual benefit right” (p.435).  
Li et al.78 defined ownership as “residual claimancy” (p.271). They claimed that 
“traditionally, ownership is defined by residual rights” and that “economists recognize that 
both residual claims and control rights are indispensable to ownership”. However, they 
omitted control rights “not because they are irrelevant but for technical tractability” and 
they conjectured that “their results apply to control rights as well” (p.271). Similarly, 
Zhang79 defined ownership as “residual claimancy” (p.233). He again admitted that 
“economist have recognized that residual claim and control rights are two major 
components of ownership”, but he still omitted the control right “by assuming that the 
control right is a derivative of the residual claim” (p.233). 
More researchers “merely” neglected alienation right. For instance, Che and Qian80 
defined the ownership of a project as “(i) the right of undertaking the task of control over 
the project type, and (ii) the right of receiving an unobservable part of the revenue” (p.473). 
This definition combines the notion of use right and income right. David D. Li81 thought 
control right (p.2) and decision right over the disposition of profit (p.6) were the only two 
aspects of private property rights. Perotti et al.82 agreed that private property rights were 
“a bundle of rights” but among which the most important were “the allocations of residual 
control rights and rights to residual benefits” (p.163). W. Li83 did not make express 
definition. However, He implied that private property rights are “rights of control” and 
“residual claim”. Zhou and Wang84 agreed that “the modern theory of property rights 
views ownership as a system of control rights and cash flow rights” (p.312).  
In contrast to the omission of alienation right, Furubotn and Pejovich85 opined that the 
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 Grossman and Hart, “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration” 
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right of ownership in an asset consisted of “the right to use it, to change its form and 
substance, and to transfer all rights in the asset through, e.g. sale, or some rights through, 
e.g. rental” (p.1140). This concept included both use right and alienation right, with income 
right missing.  
Ownership per se is not important to the private property rights. The Hong Kong land 
tenure system is a good example. All lands in Hong Kong belonged to the Crown before 
1997 and to the Hong Kong government after 1997. However, the individual land 
“owners” still enjoy the use right, income right and alienation right, hence possessing the 
private property rights. If ownership per se is important, then this international famous 
example of capitalistic economy will have become “socialistic”. In our survey, there was 
one work that seemed to have thought ownership as one decisive factor for private property 
rights86. The authors thought there were four basic tenets of property rights: ownership, 
residual claimant, alienation right, residual right of control.   
Examples of correct definition of private property rights 
Fortunately, there have been a few works which revealed a correct understanding of the 
private property rights. For instance, Putterman87 indicated that the “core bundle of rights 
that comprise ‘ownership’ are the right to utilize the asset (utilization right), the right to 
possess the fruits (and responsibility for the negative outcomes, such as damages and 
debts), and the right to transfer these rights to another agent through gift or sale (alienation 
right)” (p.1049). Although Li et al.88 cited the definition of ownership from Furubotn and 
Pejovich89, they nevertheless added income right to the bundle, arguing that the three 
elements of ownership were “the right to sell an asset”, “the right to the returns generated 
from an asset”, and “the right to change the form or substance of an asset” (p.1146).  
Other examples of correct definition of private property rights90 will be reviewed in the 
analysis of the nature of TVE below. Researchers have had divergent views on the nature 
of the TVE. The key to understanding its nature is whether or not researchers had a correct 
concept of private property rights. 
 
THE NATURE OF TVE 
The nature of township and village enterprise (TVE) was one of the most controversial 
topics in the literature of economic transition in China. Numerous researches have intended 
to identify its nature. Examples were Chang and Wang91, Che and Qian92, Gordon and Li93, 
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 Chang and Wang, “The Nature of the Township-Village Enterprise” (1994). 
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 Che and Qian, “Insecure Property Rights and Government Ownership of Firms” (1998a).  Che, Jiahua, 
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Hsiao et al.94, Jin and Qian95, Li96, Montinola et al.97, Naughton98, Nee99, Oi100, Perotti et 
al.101, Sun102, Walder103, Weitzman and Xu104, Zhang105, Zhu106. The following two sections 
concentrate on the relationship of the researchers’ concept of private property rights and 
their ideas of the nature of TVEs. Table 2 shows a survey of 18 works that sought to 
discover the nature of TVEs. It is interesting to compare the authors’ definition of private 
property rights and their opinions on the nature of TVEs. Generally, authors who had 
correct definition of private property rights would agree that township and village 
governments (TVGs) are the owners of the TVEs. However, authors who either had wrong 
concept or did not specify their understanding of private property rights had diverging 
views on the nature of TVEs. This will be detailed below. 
[Table 2 here] 
The nature of TVE with wrong or no definition of private property rights 
There are 6 works on the nature of TVEs that had provided wrong definitions of private 
property rights107. There were a range of opinions among these works. Some authors 
thought that TVEs were owned by local citizens but controlled by the local government108. 
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Still some thought that TVEs were owned by local governments109. Others insisted that 
TVEs had ambiguous or vaguely defined property rights110.  
There are 9 works that studied the nature of TVEs but did not provide a definition of 
property rights. Three works thought that TVEs are owned by community members and 
controlled by the TVGs111. Another 3 works thought TVGs owned the TVEs112. One work 
simply summarized theories of TVEs but did not provide its own understanding113. 
Another work thought that TVEs could be characterized as hybrid forms114. The remaining 
one work115 was notable in that it emphasized that the property right structure of TVEs 
should not be regarded as static. Rather, TVEs have evolved from de facto TVG ownership 
in the past to the present diversified forms. The most notable form was joint stock 
cooperatives.  
The nature of TVE with correct definition of private property rights 
Researchers who had a correct understanding of private property rights would find that 
the ownership of TVEs was held by the TVGs. There are three such works in our survey. 
Naughton116 opined that township and village officials in their official capacity owned the 
TVEs because they possessed all the “key components of property rights: control of 
residual income, the right to dispose of assets, and the right to appoint and dismiss 
managers and assume direct control in necessary” (p.267). Similarly, Walder117 opined that 
the Township and Village Government (TVG) held the property rights of TVEs as they 
held “all rights to control, income flows, and sale or liquidation” (p.270). A further 
example is Smyth118 who also agreed that TVG exercised the property rights in the TVE 
as it possessed “the privileges of ownership, i.e., the right to transfer, use, or appropriate 
the assets” (p.788).  
The nature of TVE interpreted 
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Those who regarded community members as the “owners” of TVEs sometimes neglect 
the matter of voluntary. Chang and Wang119, with wrong definition of private property right 
as reviewed above, sought to provide a rationale for the reason why the control right is 
given to the TVGs. They argued that the control right was given to TVGs because 
“ordinary citizens could not provide security and access to resources” (p.434). Although 
they correctly identified TVGs as the owner of the TVEs, they erred in that they assumed 
that the citizens voluntarily submitted their property rights to the government. Zhang120 
made similar mistakes in determining who the principals were in the public economy. As 
detailed in the previous section and Table 1, Zhang thought that the “community members” 
or “ordinary citizens” were the principals who delegated their power to the “central 
committee” or the “central planner”. The mistakes were obvious. The “community 
members” or “ordinary citizens” did not do so voluntarily, and they did not have the option 
to escape such an arrangement. 
Two points could be deduced from the above analysis. The first is that we do not know 
the nature of a TVE unless we know who has the control right, residual claim right and 
alienation right of it. The second is that ownership structure of TVEs was not static but 
evolving. From late 1970s to mid-1990s, most TVEs were owned by TVGs, although some 
TVEs were "fake collectives" - only using collective label for protection and economic 
benefit121. These were correctly observed by those authors who had a correct understanding 
of private property rights. As institutional arrangements changed, when the political 
climate was no longer unfavorable to private ownership, and when the government no 
longer had comparative advantage over individuals on the procurement of resources, more 
TVEs had evolved into private ownership.  
I have no intention to make a conclusion on how TVEs have evolved recently. The 
purpose of this section is to demonstrate that a wrong concept of private property rights 
could hinder one’s understanding of the economic nature of TVEs. 
 
CONCLUSION 
  The great reform in China has been unique in human history. It successfully transformed 
a planned economy into a market one in less than 30 years, accompanied with a marvelous 
increase in economic performance. The experience in China would be most valuable for 
the understanding and development of institutional economics. However, misuse or 
misconception of theories could hinder one’s understanding of enterprise governance and 
reform in China.  On the one hand, inappropriate theories were used to approach some 
issues. On the other hand, numerous new theories or terms were developed to explain those 
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concepts perfectly understandable if one has a correct concept of private property rights. 
This paper has proposed that principal-agent theory is not suitable for analyzing 
state-owned enterprises as by definition the principals must be able to make decisions and 
own the property rights. It further demonstrated that the application of the theory had been 
problematic because of the enigmatic identify of the principals and the inability of 
deducing refutable hypotheses. Whether this theory is applicable to advanced capitalist 
economies is beyond the scope of this paper. One primary reason for the divergent views 
on the identity of principal was the widespread misconceptions on the private property 
rights. This misconception further led to divergent views on the nature of another 
important actor in China’s economy, the township and village enterprises. Since 
state-owned enterprises and township and village enterprises were the only two significant 
forms of enterprises in the early stage of China’s reform, the coverage of this paper is 
hence comprehensive. It is hoped that clarification of these three concepts would facilitate 
further and better understanding of the transition economy in China. 
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Table 1: Who are the principals and who are the agents? 
Ref. Author 
(Year) 
Enterprise 
Type 
Principal and Agent Relationship 
1. Cauley and 
Sandler 
(1992) 
SOE Principal: SOE manager;  
Agents: workers  
In addition, an SOE represents a multilevel organization, for which 
principal-agent interactions exist between each pair of hierarchical 
levels. 
2. Cauley and 
Sandler 
(2001) 
SOE Principal: manager; 
Agents: workers  
There are other pairs but this one should be the focal PA relationship 
3. Chen and 
Rozelle 
(1999) 
TVE Principal: Officials in the community;  
Agent: Not specified 
4. Hsiao et al. 
(1998) 
TVE Principal: local government;  
Agent: the TVE, especially its manager 
5. Hua et al. 
(2006) 
SOE The principal is invisible (p.407) 
6. Li and Wu 
(2002) 
SOE Principal: government agencies;  
Agent: SOE employees 
7. Lin et al. 
(1998) 
SOE Not specified clearly but could be implied from the text: 
Principal: the state; 
Agent: manager 
8. Lin and 
Zhu (2000) 
SOE Two-tiered PA relationship:  
Principal: government (or the people);  
First tier agent and principal to the second tier agent: government 
bureaucrats;  
Second tier agent: enterprises managers 
9. Mengistae 
and Xu 
(2004) 
SOE Not specified clearly but could be implied from the text: 
Principal: local government that typically owns the SOEs; 
Agent: CEO of SOE 
10. Shirley and 
Xu (1998) 
SOE SOEs have no clear residual claimant, they are subject to many 
principals (p.360) 
11. Shirley and 
Xu (2000) 
SOE Principal: government officials;  
Agent: SOE manager. 
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Ref. Author 
(Year) 
Enterprise 
Type 
Principal and Agent Relationship 
12. Tylecote 
and Cai 
(2004) 
SOE Two-tiered PA relationship: 
Principal: the state or people; 
First order agent: the government;  
Second-order agent: top-management  
13. Xu (1998) SOE Principal: government;  
Agent: managers 
14. Zhang 
(1997) 
SOE & 
TVE 
Dual hierarchical PA chain: 
Upward PA relationship:  
Principals (owner): residual claimants (co-owners) of the public 
economy (community members);  
Agent: Central committee representing the whole community;  
Downward PA relationship: 
Principal: Central committee; 
Agent: Insider member of the firm 
15. Zhang 
(1998) 
SOE Before Reform: 
1. Original Principal: ordinary citizens; 
2. Acting Principal: central planners; 
3. Agent to 2 and Principal to 4: industrial bureau; 
4. Agent to 3: insider member of the firm. 
After Reform: 
Two Legitimized principals: The government and the insider member 
of the firm; 
Double-faced agent: industrial bureau. 
16. Zhou 
(2002) 
SOE There is no principal (p.139) 
17. Zhou and 
Wang 
(2000) 
SOE Principal: the state, or more accurately, every Chinese Citizen: 
Agents: by order the central government, provincial government, the 
local officials, the managers and workers. 
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Table 2: Concept of private property rights and the nature of TVE 
Ownership Definition 
Ref. 
Author 
(Year) Use 
right 
Income 
right 
Alienation 
right 
Nominal 
ownership 
Nature of TVE 
1. 
Chang 
and Wang 
(1994) 
Yes Yes No No 
A TVE is owned by local citizens and 
controlled by TVG. Control right was 
assigned to the TVG because ordinary 
citizens cannot provide security and access to 
resources. 
2. 
Che and 
Qian 
(1998a) 
Yes Yes No No 
Proposed a model of ownership under 
insecure property rights. TVEs are owned by 
local governments because they can limit 
state predation. 
3. 
Che and 
Qian 
(1998b) 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
TVEs are characterized as community 
enterprises which is the bottom tier of a 
three-tier structure, in which the middle tier is 
the community government and the top tier 
consists of the residents. The community 
residents are the beneficiaries of TVEs. 
4. 
Gordon 
and Li 
(1991) 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Local governments effectively owned and 
controlled TVEs 
5. 
Hsiao et 
al. (1998) N/A N/A N/A N/A Local government in practice owned TVEs 
6. 
Jin and 
Qian 
(1998) 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Summarized 5 theories of TVEs but did not 
provide their own theory. 
7. Li (1996) Yes Yes No No 
TVEs have ambiguous property rights. They 
are jointly controlled by entrepreneurs and 
the local governments. 
8. 
Montinola 
et al. 
(1996) 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
TVEs are owned by township and village 
communities and controlled by TVG. 
9. 
Naughton 
(1994) Yes Yes Yes No 
Township and village officials in their official 
capacity owned the TVEs. 
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Ownership Definition 
Ref. 
Author 
(Year) Use 
right 
Income 
right 
Alienation 
right 
Nominal 
ownership 
Nature of TVE 
10. Oi (1995) N/A N/A N/A N/A 
TVEs are owned by TVG (local state 
corporatism); Some TVEs are "fake 
collectives"- only using collective label for 
protection and economic benefit. 
11. 
Perotti et 
al. (1999) Yes Yes No. No 
Community members, as owners, possess the 
right to derive both short-run and long-run 
residual benefits from the TVE's operation, 
residual control rights rest in TVG. The 
community as a collective equity holder and 
the TVG as the executive equity holder. 
12. 
Smyth 
(1998) Yes Yes Yes No TVG has de facto ownership rights of TVEs. 
13. 
Sun 
(2000) N/A N/A N/A N/A 
The property right structure of TVEs should 
not be regarded as static. TVEs have evolved 
from de facto TVG ownership to the present 
diversified forms. Competition has induced 
such ownership reforms. 
14. 
Victor 
(1992) N/A N/A N/A N/A 
TVEs are characterized as hybrid forms. They 
are neither public (state-owned) nor private, 
in theory their properties belong to all who 
live within the jurisdiction of the local 
governments. 
15. 
Walder 
(1995) Yes Yes Yes No 
TVE is not a hybrid of state and private 
ownership; they are under a form of public 
ownership no different from the large urban 
state sector. 
16. 
Weitzman 
and Xu 
(1994) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
TVE is a vaguely defined producer 
cooperative. The community government is 
the de facto executive owner of the TVEs. 
There are no residual claimants. Neither the 
government nor the residents have the 
alienation right. The government has no 
residual control right as well. 
17. 
Zhang 
(1997) No* Yes No No 
TVEs are "public owned" and their property 
rights are also "vaguely-defined". 
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Ownership Definition 
Ref. 
Author 
(Year) Use 
right 
Income 
right 
Alienation 
right 
Nominal 
ownership 
Nature of TVE 
18. 
Zhu 
(1998) N/A N/A N/A N/A 
A TVE is in principle owned by all the 
residents in a township or village but 
controlled by the TVG, or more precisely, the 
TVG officials. 
* The author omitted control right because it is “a derivative of the residual claim”. 
 
